Manipulative Strategies and Tactics of Mass Media Communication (on the example of «The Name of Russia television project) by Голев, Н.Д. et al.
– 1834 –
Journal of  Siberian Federal University.  Humanities & Social Sciences 12 (2012 5) 1834-1842 
~ ~ ~
УДК 811.161.1’27
Manipulative Strategies and Tactics  
of Mass Media Communication  
(on the example of «The Name  
of Russia» television project)
Nikolay D. Golev and Olga E. Yakovleva*
Kemerovo State University
6 Krasnaya St., Kemerovo, 650043 Russia 1
Received 04.12.2012, received in revised form 11.12.2012, accepted 24.12.2012
This article is devoted to the research of “The Name of Russia” project regarded as an example of 
manipulative strategies and tactics of mass media communication. The research is done in terms of 
cognitive and communicative linguistics, speech act theory, ordinary political science in linguistics 
and the conception of practice in social sciences.
Keywords: mass media communication, discourse, speech manipulation, identity, political science in 
linguistics, proper names.
* Corresponding author E-mail address: ngolevd@mail.ru
1 © Siberian Federal University. All rights reserved
Introduction
This article refers to the research paradigm 
of the natural language manipulative potential, 
actively used in different sorts of modern forms 
of communication such as commercial, media, 
and political ones. It appeared due to a famous 
PR campaign focused on “The Name of Russia” 
TV project which was shown in 2008 and 
caused a great public response (and discourses): 
academic, journalistic, advertising and political. 
“The Name of Russia” term has become a brand, 
combining ordinary and scientific reflections, 
ideological and pragmatic (marketing) ideas, 
people’s expectations and the political elite’s 
interests. In this paper only a few aspects of this 
enormous mental-communicative phenomenon 
are considered. The subject of this article is to 
reconstruct “The Name of Russia” project as a 
communicative act and, more specifically, to 
reveal a peculiar character of communicative 
intentions realization from the speech act theory 
perspective (Austin, 1986) (that is, to identify 
the project’s illocution, locution and perlocution, 
transposing the terminology traditionally applied 
to a particular act of speaking, to a TV show 
multi-code communication).
Materials
The idea that a human lives in the world of 
names, which can be proper and common, more or 
less known, doesn’t already seem revolutionary. 
However, using a large arsenal of language means 
daily, an average human is absolutely sure that 
language is completely dependent on him and 
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exists for him in fact. This reflects the immanent 
capacity of language, which L. Wittgenstein 
defined as “absence of problems” and “involvement 
in everyday practice”. And yet this very daily 
routine, everyday practices that construct a 
human’s everyday activity are of a special interest 
for modern science as well as for different types 
of pragmatically oriented communication. So, a 
modern commercial doesn’t seek only to report 
about the time and place of the goods sale (what? 
where? when?) and to make its main attributes 
(brand name, shape, color, special features of 
packaging, music, commercial characters, etc.) 
recognizable but also to specify the goods with 
the help of these techniques in order to induct 
them into the structure of an individual’s non-
reflective everyday life. Therefore, people will 
sooner or later get used to the fact that a better 
toothpaste, guarding their mouths against all 
possible diseases, is “Colgate”; and it keeps every 
person from a potential danger. So, an endless 
flow of supporting commercial information 
doesn’t let anyone doubt the correctness of their 
choice. Thus, the names don’t just help us choose 
the goods from a set of similar ones. At some 
point they start foisting them on us. However, 
a commercial is still a relatively “honest” way 
of manipulating our consciousness: the rules of 
the game are more or less clear to us and no one 
expects any “disinterested” advertising from well 
financed communication. But it is much worse 
when a communicator’s intentions are not so 
obvious and he is not “a clearly defined customer” 
which is required by the advertising legislation. 
We mean various regulatory discourses that daily 
construct our loyalty or, conversely, orderliness, 
ethicality, culture, etc. Some of them can be 
attributed to PR-communications, the subjects of 
which are represented by various commercial and 
public organizations. The other part belongs to the 
discourse of power. Its realization can be gained, 
in addition to usual Soviet-era pathos, by using 
the methods which are not so explicit. Apart from 
a rich arsenal of logical and rhetorical techniques 
(facts selection, antithesis constructions, 
“pinning the labels”, etc.), the media widely use 
the methods of the so-called “right nomination”: 
the militants were annihilated but the Russian 
army soldiers were killed; the conflict in South 
Ossetia is memorable due to the “forcing Georgia 
to peace” phrase; in order not to hurt the public 
with the reports of a considerable number of 
deaths at the Sayan-Shushenskaya hydro-electric 
power station mass media gradually increased 
the lists using the “death toll reached ...” locution. 
Representing discursive practices of power, these 
examples form a unified field due to the identity 
of each of the four characteristics (following 
Foucault): 1) what type of phenomena can be 
the subject of this discourse, 2) who can take the 
position of a speaking subject, 3) what kinds of 
concepts can be acceptable in this discourse, and 
4) what theories can be conceived and formulated 
in it. In this article a particular interest is given to 
how the first and second principles interact with 
the third one. We daily face the accomplishment 
of the following interaction: if someone calls a 
servant of the law “a militiaman” he indirectly 
determines his belonging to the discourse of a 
law-abiding citizen who respects the power and 
its individual members; if he calls him “a ment” 
he expresses a marginal discourse with a typical 
cynical attitude towards life.
However, the discourses, responsible for the 
formation of the Russians’ national identity with 
its diffuse and heterogeneous structure, are of a 
particular relevance to the manipulation, while 
the success of “power-people” communication 
requires a certain and predictable recipient. 
Without going into a social and historical 
background we should only note that the issue 
of the modern Russians’ identity is associated, 
among other things, with the absence of a 
consistent historical foretime comprehension. 
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According to V. Morozov (2009), after the Soviet 
Union’s breakup Russia had to build a new 
nation’s state and form the national identity as 
many former Soviet republics did. But we have 
chosen the conception of the state following the 
Soviet State traditions and the imperial historical 
narrative as such. This prevented from forming a 
clear view of Russian (including Soviet) history. 
Thus, one of the most important factors of the 
national identity formation is the attitude towards 
the past, its “assumption”. Mass media (including 
visual media) play a great role in this process in 
modern society. According to V. Zvereva, “in 
today’s media culture TV is an authoritative 
source which broadcasts images of the past to 
the enormous audience and forms an image of 
a particular historic epoch, its major events and 
meanings” (Zvereva, 2004: p. 160). That is why 
the appearance of “The Name of Russia” TV 
project which was positioned as nothing less than 
“a historical choice of the year 2008”, became 
non-random and predictable.
In fact, no communication is possible 
without the audience’s interest in the project. 
So, obeying the requirements of media industry, 
the choice of a historic person number 1 gained 
the following classical-stage form, which could 
make the audience watch the project: on May 7, 
2008 the list of 500 great names of the past was 
published and the on-line voting was launched; 
on June 12, 50 people who received the most 
backing on the project site were selected; on 
October 5, a television show began (it was based 
on the discussion of 12 “finalists” of the polls); 
on December 27-28, the final took place, and 
on December 28, according to the TV debates 
results the name of Alexander Nevsky was 
chosen. The very essence of the project appeared 
to be dependent on “the media” factor. In general, 
the fact that the newsmakers can be represented 
not only by people who are alive but by dead 
souls as well is a rich idea. For a good reason, 
great and famous people are far more among the 
dead than among the living. Due to this there is 
such a space for all sorts of ratings, sociological 
measurements, shows, etc. which any “Ice Ages” 
and other “Star Academies” could never dream of 
(The News, 11/13/2008).
In addition to these errors, there were other 
reasons to doubt the a priori installed objectivity 
of the project: why were just these 500 “great dead 
persons” selected, why were just these 12 public 
and cultural figures chosen, why did the “lawyers” 
for these12 historic persons only pass “the final”, 
etc. In the very beginning of the project there 
happened a scientific scandal concerning the stuff 
of 500 historic names: the Institute of Russian 
History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 
which was announced the project’s scientific 
base by “Russia” TV channel and participated in 
forming the list of 500, denied this information 
later. What caused the historians’ greater anxiety 
was the way the material was represented at that 
stage (a brief historical background about this or 
that person often included the data distorting not 
only the facts but also merits and significance of 
these figures for the Russian history).
It is obvious that the project creators’ 
illocution (communicative intention) is 
represented by at least two types of intentions: 
an explicit (or declared) one and an implicit (or 
real?) one. The explicit intention can be found 
on the project site http://www.nameofrussia.ru. 
According to its authors, “The Name of Russia” 
is the choice of the most valued, conspicuous 
and symbolic personality of the Russian History 
<…> and that choice is not only leisured but also 
evaluative. Further, they concretize the alleged 
“value” of the personalities and offer a possible 
semantic opposition such as, for example, what is 
dearer to the Russians: Pushkin’s cheerful poetry 
or Dostoevsky’s sapiential prose, Alexander 
Nevsky’s ice of righteous sword or Vladimir 
Lenin’s fierce revolutionary speech. This means 
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the project’s objective, declared by its organizers, 
has no ideological background and is ultimately 
reduced to the choice of a “favorite” historic 
character. The project’s “historicity” and the 
lack of purpose to make an idol are stressed by 
its producer, Alexander Lyubimov: “When we 
decided to adapt our British colleagues’ idea to 
choose the main historic character of Russia we 
completely changed the format. We discussed 
the characters more deeply that corresponds to 
the attitude towards history in Russia. We don’t 
choose the best and greatest but review the 
history” (MC, 5/12/2008).
However, the transparency of the project’s 
objectives was quite doubtful from the very 
beginning, and mass media and forums 
responded by the “true” goal wording. So, the 
questionnaire survey on the project’s official 
forum in December 2008 also contained the 
issue of “What, in your opinion, is the main 
objective of “The Name of Russia” project?” 
The participants’ answers reveal the attitude 
of some part of the public towards the goal 
and rules of the game, such as the following 
one, for example: I used to think that the goal 
was to choose a Name honestly. Now, my own 
experiment, which was conducted yesterday 
(02/11/2008), makes me doubt it to a great extent, 
though it didn’t regard my candidate; I expected 
to get independent votes of the project’s active 
participants, i.e. those who are interested in it 
(the project). In fact, it led to the struggle against 
Stalinism, Leninism, Marxism and attempts to 
persuade to vote for Pushkin (a gifted gentleman 
and a slacker); Commercial + the next portion 
of zombie injections. Thus, the project’s active 
audience offered other objectives which can be 
reduced to the following four versions:
The project’s goal is the national identity 
formation.
The project’s goal is a sociological survey 
aimed at identifying the audience’s expectations 
and their subsequent effective exploitation in pre-
election promises.
The project’s goal is the substitution of a 
real political process, missing at present, by the 
choice simulation.
The substitution of a “real” (going from the 
bottom) passionary national idea by its imitation 
and the imposition of its construction from 
“the top”. If we reconstruct the project makers’ 
illocution, basing on its results, the hypothesis 
of their original programming seems quite 
reasonable, the ideological consistency of the 
“choice” providing a civil society’s unity, is too 
evident: 1) Alexander Nevsky is a symbol of the 
victorious nation (predicated by his subsequent 
canonization as a saint), 2) Stalin is a successful 
manager, and 3) Stolypin is a symbol of a strong 
government hand and the only person capable 
of successful implementation of economic 
reforms. Pushkin’s ideas of cultural unity and, 
moreover, his liberal ideas, diminishing the role 
of the state in the country development, appeared 
to be unused. There occurs an unintentional 
association with Mr. Uvarov’s “slogan” of XIX 
century – “Orthodoxy – autocracy – nationality”. 
There was a so-called trial run of its present 
time resemblance on the project (something like 
“Orthodoxy – state – modernization”).
Thus, “The Name of Russia” communication 
project should be viewed not as a dialogue with 
a provided opportunity of feedback (survey) but 
as a managerial communication, the purpose of 
which is to create a certain sense in the receptive 
audience. This assumption is valid at least due to 
the fact that the project was broadcast on “Russia”, 
a state TV channel. That is, instead of the expected 
assertive communicative act we get a directive 
one. Technologically this communication is much 
like a brand communication, and this is confirmed 
by A. Lyubimov’s corresponding considerations: 
“The Name of Russia” brand is developing the 
“Russia TV Channel” brand, the “Country of 
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Russia” brand. A certain post-modernism in 
“clumsy” declension gives the necessary feeling 
of a brand aggression”.
The illocution type causes the locution 
embodiment of the message (in this case the 
project’s form is meant). Thus, the ordinary 
form of the opinion poll, deprived of the show 
elements, corresponds to the declared objective 
(to identify a historic figure considered the most 
valuable by the Russians) to a greater degree and 
could help to avoid at least three types of errors: 
1) the unrepresentative sample (those who don’t 
watch “Russia” channel are not involved into the 
project), 2) the unreliable methods of the votes 
gathering (on-line voting, technical organization 
and results of which are doubted even by the cast, 
caused a special buzz); 3) the possibility of results 
falsification by the project organizers, who were 
repeatedly accused both by the common audience 
and different political forces.
The next stages of the project were not 
unequivocally accepted by the public either. 
Thus, the Ukrainian edition of “The Gazeta 24” 
calls the show “finalists” the product of a new 
Russian imperial identity: it had to go through 
the years, Vladimir Putin’s two-term presidency, 
a long period of fantastic energy prices increase, 
before the Russian society has once again felt 
the imperial itch (24.ua, 03/12/08). As for the 
“seconds” of the final dozen, their line-up is not 
obviously driven by presentation of scientifically 
reliable information, but the intention to make a 
program rating. Consequently, the recognition 
(sometimes scandalous) and the skills of public 
speaking, but not professional knowledge of 
history, became the main communication skills 
of such a “second”. However, according to V. 
Zvereva, history, being a delicate matter related 
to the memory and identity issues and enshrining 
a “high” sense of culture, becomes generally 
accessible on TV. Any person who became famous 
and realized his / her potential in any sphere 
(politics, literature or show business) can act as an 
expert in the field of history there (Zvereva, 2004). 
So, a famous film director Nikita Mikhalkov, 
metropolitan Kirill, the governor of Krasnodar 
Territory Alexander Tkachev, the literary critic 
Yu. Kublanovsky, the communist party leader 
Gennady Zyuganov, the Russian ambassador to 
Ukraine Viktor Chernomyrdin, etc. joined the 
staff of the “defenders”. However, being non-
professional historians, the “lawyers” took their 
role with great responsibility. M. Davydova, 
an observer of “The Izvestiya”, emphasizes the 
contradiction between the pathos of the defense 
of their heroes and a real media significance of 
such defense: We could frequently read that 
the project experienced the lack of a scientific 
basis. And any temptation to attach scientific 
and historical character to them would be the 
history profanation, for scientific format of mass 
popular spectacle is impossible. What confuses 
me, honestly, is not the lack of historicism but the 
participation of serious people who are involved 
in a post-modern game show and believe in an 
important mission entrusted to them. On the 
contrary, by all means I would try to leave the 
project in the space of Social Art (Izvestiya, 
13/11/2008).
Results
On the locution level the project’s 
communication can be characterized as the 
substitution of discourses: under the guise of the 
expected scientific (sociological) discourse the 
media discourse and ideological discourse were 
represented.
However, the project has generated some 
other discourses in the communicative space:
- a nationalistic one: What is the name of 
Russia? Whose name represents the motherland in 
our minds? Millions of people have already voted 
(on the Internet, yet). Here are the first six: Stalin, 
Nicholas II, Lenin, Vysotsky, Peter I, Pushkin. 
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The main contenders for the name of Russia are 
a Georgian, a German, a evrokalmyk (not in the 
sense of European Kalmyk, but in the sense of the 
Jewish quarter), a semi-Jewish, a Russian. Hence, 
people, solving such an important issue, choose a 
person not by blood. That means that the frenzy 
of nationalism, so much spoken about, has been a 
little bit exaggerated (MC, 17/07/2008);
- a political one: Vladimir Lavrov, the deputy 
director of the Institute of Russian History, Doctor 
of Historical Sciences, who is worried about 
Stalin’s and Lenin’s leadership on “The Name of 
Russia” RTR television project, calls on “Russia” 
TV channel for changing the rules of voting in 
order not to allow the communists, consolidating 
around their idols, to win. According to Professor 
Lavrov, “Lenin’s or Stalin’s victory in the 
referendum will cause the communists to declare 
even more loudly that the results of presidential 
and parliamentary elections in the country have 
been rigged”;
- a geopolitical one (which is more global in 
relation to the previous discourse): Perhaps, the 
project supervisors quickly added the voices to 
Nicholas, fearing that Stalin had got the first place 
in the game they started. They started worrying 
about the opinion of the West about them. But 
the West really associates us with Stalin, vodka, 
frost, bears (MC, 17/07/2008).
By the perlocution (impact implementation 
on the audience) we mean the project results. 
Strictly speaking, not only final published data 
should be considered as the result. All sorts of 
discourses which appeared in the course of the 
project and were discussed in the article should 
be taken into consideration However, the name of 
the key Russian figure, detected (or presented as 
such) during the project, still remains the central 
problem.
The project perlocutionary effect 
determination has generated at least two levels 
of doubt and two types of discourse. The first 
and seemingly suggesting itself is the possible 
manipulation with the election results. A striking 
Stalin’s and Lenin’s leadership in the first two 
phases of the project made not only the communist 
ideology supporters doubt the final outcome. 
Thus, according to the project’s official version, 
“Echo of Moscow” radio station (with a clearly 
“non-communist” audience), which announced 
a similar vote in July 2008, faced the following 
results: Stalin was given the first place and left 
Nicholas II far behind. We can assume that in 
order to avoid the undesirable “communist” finale 
the project organizers gradually began promoting 
a less controversial historic figure. Thus, in the 
course of the project Alexander Nevsky became 
known as St. Alexander Nevsky and then as a 
blessed saint prince Alexander Nevsky. Watching 
this transformation, some viewers of the project 
proposed: “Should we, probably, just add “a 
blessed saint prince Alexander Nevsky, the project 
winner, a new Name of Russia”?” Meanwhile, 
the figure of Alexander Nevsky in the final draft 
is not accidental. The researcher I. Danilevsky 
analyzes a similar evolution of the assessment 
of Battle on the Ice’s and Alexander Nevsky’s 
significance in Russian history: the battle, small 
and local by its relevance, was reinterpreted first 
by the church in the period of Orthodoxy crisis 
(as a result a politically not-irreproachable Prince 
Alexander was canonized as a faithful for his 
refusal to join the catholics’ action against the 
Horde). Later, in Soviet times, when “Alexander 
Nevsky”, the film made in 1937 but kept not-
shown till the beginning of World War II, became 
the basis for the formation and retention of a new 
myth of Battle on the Ice in public consciousness, 
in which a religious aspect gave the way to a 
geopolitical one. Prince Alexander became 
the main defender of Russia from Western 
encroachments. Thus, Battle on the Ice became 
a symbol of success. Summing up his historical 
excursus, I. Danilevsky states that the impartial 
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approach to the assessment of Battle on the Ice 
has not yet found a due recognition in Russia. He 
concludes: “On the contrary, there are the signs 
that it will become popular to combine two heroic 
traditions – “Orthodox” and “geopolitical” – in 
the near future” (Danilevsky, 2004, p. 28-39).
Thus, we can assume that the project’s 
outcome and, in particular, the discourses 
generated by it fully correspond to our assumption 
about the initially proposed directive, myth 
forming communication. And, undoubtedly, 
“historical” myth-making, the theme of historical 
memory extends beyond the boundaries of 
individual psychology. According to B. Dubin, 
memory “can be adequately understood here 
as a metaphor or a nest of metaphors, which 
symbolically transcribe, signify and resignify 
a more or less stable or, conversely, unstable 
structure of the society and its basic institutions 
in people’s minds” (Dubin, 2004, p. 68). In Russia 
the collective identification and the structure 
of an imaginary identity of people were subject 
to a significant transformation in the course of 
the past 20 years [Ibid.] In this case not only 
the problem of adults’ heterogeneous identity is 
relevant today. The quality of teaching history 
in modern Russian school makes the researchers 
talk about the loss of the unified cultural language 
between generations, and it is largely due to the 
gaps in presentation of the recent historical past, 
including cultural studies, in school textbooks 
(Veselov, 2004, p. 126-131). Consequently, there 
is the ground for the planned perlocutionary effect 
implementation in our contemporary Russian 
society.
However, here comes another level of 
doubt about its attainability. In our opinion, the 
idea looks doubtful from the very beginning: as 
the project organizers’ probable task is to find 
a “new” historical identity of Russia, i.e. the 
creation of the “Russia = N” rule, where N is 
“a right historic figure in ideological terms”, it 
becomes obvious that a single project, even if it 
was broadcast weekly and for several months, is 
unable to create the conditions for the emergence 
of a regular “Russia = N” association. According 
to Wittgenstein, “it is impossible that the rule 
is followed by one person only and only once” 
(Wittgenstein, 1994, p. 199). In other words, the 
rule is usually observed in case of a repetitive 
behavior in a similar situation (Volkov, 2008).
In addition, when we learn proper names 
we investigate the background, the unconscious 
people’s practice (Heidegger). Therefore, 
identification of such categories as “The Name of 
Russia” is a priori impossible if the study is not 
done in the field but constructed artificially within 
a TV project with the elements characteristic to a 
show and demagogy.
Discussion
Therefore, the project results are not the 
identification of the Russians’ real attitude to a 
historic character but their attitude towards the 
project and its participants. In order to make the 
results of this experiment reliable it is necessary 
to study people’s everyday attitude to history. 
However, the issue of the most appropriate method 
remains open as even a question like “Which 
historic figure ...?” turns the practice from the 
background to the foreground. Therefore, it is 
likely that if we examine the actual practice of 
the “relationship” between historic figures and 
people who studied in a Soviet school, Stalin and 
Lenin would have the highest rates. For example, 
Lenin is not just an abstract historic figure. 
He is a part of the history of Soviet children’s 
personality development (the stories about little 
Volodya Ul’yanov were an essential component 
of kindergarten and elementary school curricular, 
asterisk of October children, joining the pioneers’ 
organization on the leader’s birthday anniversary, 
a solemn pioneers’ guard at Lenin’s bust at school, 
etc.) while all the other “members” of the project 
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are usual characters of the Russian history who 
are better or worse studied at school.
It is also very important that the very 
format of this show is been still undeveloped 
by the Russians who have no cultivated habit 
to reflect on their historical preferences and, 
moreover, to participate in their public rankings. 
The thoughts about this phenomenon can be 
found on the site of the “Russian Line” Orthodox 
Christian Information Agency: the question 
itself contradicts the essential quality of Russian 
patriotism – his conciliarism, when each person 
supplements another, and when there can be 
neither the first one nor the second one nor 
the twenty-fifth one. However, it is hardly just 
to exaggerate this side of national mentality. 
The comparison of epochs, events and national 
leaders is a key instrument to form the nation’s 
ordinary historical consciousness. Some interest 
to “ratings” can be already seen at the lowest 
level – children’s “political science”. For example, 
in the Soviet era there was a popular question 
among children – “Who is the main (smarter, 
more significant for the history) person – Lenin 
or Stalin?” But, in fact, this issue is also highly 
relevant for adult Russians. Let’s recall the 
ideology of perestroika, where they seriously 
discussed the role of Lenin and Stalin in our 
history. For example, in the plays by M. Shatrova 
Lenin is presented as an idealist, ideological 
leader, the genius, whereas Stalin is shown as a 
forger, discrediting Lenin’s ideas.
At the beginning of the show it might 
have been assumed that the established project 
objectives wouldn’t be achieved due to the essential 
impossibility to respect the requirement for the 
illusion formulated by Bourdieu and understood 
as a necessary aspect of refinement, or insertion 
in any game (Kharkhordin, 2008). However, in 
this case the “The Name of Russia” project was 
a success. Its initiators were able to “force” the 
viewers (read: people) to play some symbolic 
actions (e.g., to appoint a person, identified with 
the state), to instill that the rates of the game are 
valuable for all its participants.
In this case in the version of mass 
consciousness the designers managed to hide 
the fact that both the game itself and its rules 
are conventional in every instance. That is why 
the project captured a certain share of Russian 
population, rather than a limited group of its 
creators and participants, the search for the 
declared value turned out to be up-to-date.
Conclusion
The very fact of the project’s existence 
gave the incentive for parallel and quasi-voting, 
including “The Anti-Name of Russia” and “The 
Shame of Russia”. This indicates that the issue of 
our attitude towards the names and significance 
of their bearers for the Russian history and for 
a contemporary Russian’s world view remains 
open. However, our society’s mental activity 
and a new energy discursive field, generated by 
it, as well as activation of important fragments 
of the Russian conceptual picture of the world, 
included into the general ideological space of 
modern Russia, have become the most important 
manifestations of the project’s communicative 
success. The analysis of such discourses and 
modelling the national mentality on their 
basis are major tasks of communicative and 
cognitive linguistics. Their solution will lead to 
a successful study of Russian society’s everyday 
ideology as an important component of national 
mentality.
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Манипулятивные стратегии и тактики СМИ  
(на примере телевизионного проекта  
«имя Россия»)
Н.Д. Голев, О.Е. Яковлева
Кемеровский государственный университет 
Россия 650043, Кемерово, ул. Красная, 6
Исследуется проект «Имя Россия» как пример осуществления манипулятивных стратегий 
и тактик средствами массовой информации в аспекте когнитивной и коммуникативной 
лингвистики, теории речевого акта, обыденной политической лингвистики и концепции 
практики в общественных науках.
Ключевые слова: СМИ, дискурс, речевое манипулирование, идентичность, политическая наука 
в лингвистике, имена собственные.
